Instructions to students:

- Enter your student number not your name on all answer books.
- Answer two questions: one from Section A and comment on one question from Section B.
- The same material should not constitute a substantial part of more than one question.
- Section A carries 67% of the overall marks. Section B carries 33% of the overall marks.
- Begin each question in a separate answer book; label each answer book clearly with the number of the question you are answering.
- Neither books nor notes may be taken into the examination.
Section A

Answer one question.

1. To what extent should we trust officially sanctioned historians of Britain’s intelligence organisations?

2. What was the most significant change to British intelligence between 1914 and 1919?

3. Using examples from significant battles or campaigns between 1939 and 1945, show how British intelligence contributed to Allied success.

End of Section A
Section B follows overleaf
Section B

Comment on the content and the context of one of the following extracts:


Of Spies
The best and principal means for a Commander to avoid divers inconveniences and to effect many worthy designes, are, First, to be sure to keep his own deliberations and resolutions secret.

Secondly, to penetrate the designes and intentions of the enemy. For which purpose it behoveth him to have good spies, which must be exceeding well rewarded, that so they may be the readier to expose themselves to all dangers. The best and most assured spies are ones own soldieters, which (feigning some discontent for want of pay, or otherwise) enter into the enemies service, and get themselves into the Cavallry, as having best opportunity (whether in the field or in garrison) to give information. Of these it is good to have many, and in several places, the one knowing nothing of the other. You are to agree with them of the place where they shall convey their letters, as some tree, gallows, or other places easie to find [...]

There might also divers soldieters be daily sent disguised, under severall pretences, to observe what is done in the enemies leaguer, when it is near. The boors use also to serve for spies, aswell women as men, which, being not much regarded nor suspected, may have the freer accesse: but these are not always to be trusted, neither are they so well able to judge of or to pierce into businesse, and the lesse assurance and information to be had by their relations.

Section B continues overleaf
Counter Measures [against Communism]

Counter-measures to obtain intelligence to meet the situation indicated above could not but suffer to some extent in view of the fact that responsibility was divided between MI1(c) or SIS, MI5 or the Security Service, and Scotland House. In 1919 there was even a proposal to transfer the Bolshevist Section from MI5 to Scotland House, but effect was not given to this; and in subsequent years MI5 was responsible for matters connected with Communism in the Armed Forces as well as for counter-espionage measures, while the Communist movement outside the Armed Forces was the responsibility of Scotland House until 1931 [...]

In the years immediately after the war, the Russian Communist leaders continued to expect with apparent confidence the development of a revolutionary situation in other countries; and it was not until about 1923-1924 that this idea appears to have lost ground in the dominant circles in the USSR. It was doubtless in this connection that Leo Kamaneff, one of the inner circle of the Bolshevist Party who played a leading part in the Russian Revolution, visited this country and [...] attempted to establish Councils of Action. The nature of his activities was disclosed by BJs and he was subsequently expelled [...]

Russian BJs also disclosed that Soviet money was furnished to start the *Daily Herald* in the early 1920s. This subject was dealt with by the Government in the form of a White Paper [...]

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End of Section B
End of Paper